Abstract. This paper presents a model in which bank competition plays a central role for the propagation of adverse shocks and the credit channel of monetary policy. The competition between banks amplifies shocks through two adverse feedback loops on the liability side through deposits and the asset side through loans. These adverse feedback loops can lead to a collapse in economic activity if the shocks are large enough. We define an operational measure of economic stability -the distance-to-crash -as the smallest shock leading to a crash.
In a speech at the London School of Economics on January 13, 2009, Ben Bernanke declared that "In taking these actions [ie. bringing down its target for the federal funds rate by a cumulative 325 basis points], we aimed both to cushion the direct effects of the financial turbulence on the economy and to reduce the virulence of the so-called adverse feedback loop, in which economic weakness and financial stress become mutually reinforcing." This statement raises several questions. First, how should we think of the initial shock, the "financial turbulence"? What are the propagation mechanisms and "feedback loops" that undermine the stability of the economy? Second, what operational measures can be used to assess the fragility (or resilience) of the economy? Third, how are the effects of monetary policy transmitted to the economy and how can they prevent crashes? In times of stress, what objectives justify a decisive use of monetary policy?
In this paper we present a model in which banks propagate and amplify shocks but also transmit the effects of monetary policy. A crash is a situation in which the profitability of banks and non-financial firms becomes negative and economic activity collapses. First we show how adverse shocks, whether productivity shocks or liquidity shocks affecting nonfinancial firms or banks, can lead to crashes. Second we define the distance-to-crash (relative to productivity or liquidity shocks) as the size of the smallest shock that leads to a crash.
We show that the distance-to-crash increases with competition. Third, we study the role of money -the riskfree claim backed by a stock of goods held by the policymaker ("central bank").
1 The model has no nominal frictions in order to focus on the bank lending channel of monetary policy. In the absence of adverse shocks, we characterize the first-best interestrate and balance-sheet monetary policies. In particular, we consider two "unconventional"
balance-sheet policies that complement the "conventional" interest-rate policy: an interestrate neutral subsidy to bank entry and a money-supply neutral subsidy to bank entry. When the probability of large adverse shocks increases, the central bank should depart from the first-best policies, and choose to lower interest rate or use its balance-sheet to subsidize bank operations. These operations increase bank and firm profit, and the distance-to-crash, and mitigate the propagation of adverse shocks.
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Money is riskfree in the sense that its return is known when the investor makes his portfolio decision. Liability-side and asset-side liquidity spirals.
Bank profit drops

Less firm investment
Higher lending rates In the model, the credit market equilibrium is based on two main ingredients: investors make a portfolio choice between a riskfree security ("money") and risky deposits; a population of financial intermediaries ("banks") compete to raise these deposits and to lend the funds to a population of entrepreneurs.
2 Figure 1 illustrates the setup. Both entrepreneurs and bank managers set distortionary markups to cover their costs of operation, and free entry drives their profits to zero and pins down in equilibrium the endogenous numbers of banks and non-financial firms, the competition among banks, the size of the industrial sector and the risk-diversification of the representative investor. In contrast to the "principal-agent view of credit markets" developed in Gertler (1989, 1990) ; Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in which the investment wedge (between the project return and the loan rate) and the intermediation wedge (between the loan rate and the deposit rate) are due to an agency problem, we present an "imperfect-competition view of credit markets " in which the wedges are determined by the endogenous monopolistic competition between firms and between banks.
3 This "imperfect-competition view" leads to two new types of feedback loops that propagate shocks to the economy (see Figure 2 ). In liability-side liquidity spirals, a decrease in bank deposits lowers bank profit, and in equilibrium, forces some banks to exit.
Bank competition is relaxed and banks charge higher markups and offer lower deposit rates, leading to a further decrease in bank deposits. In asset-side liquidity spirals, a decrease in the demand for loans from non-financial firms lowers bank profit and forces some banks to exit. Bank competition is also relaxed and banks charge higher markups with higher lending rates, which lowers firm profit, leads to the exit of more firms and a further decrease in the demand for bank loans. When the shocks are large enough, these vicious dynamics can lead to crashes in which neither firms nor banks have incentives to operate and the unique 2 Bank competition is modeled as spatial competition (Besanko and Thakor, 1992; Sussman, 1993; Chiappori, Perez-Castrillo, and Verdier, 1995) . The complementarity between production and financing can be interpreted either as geographical complementarity (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Degryse and Ongena, 2005) or informational complementarity (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein, 2005) .
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Stein (1998); Bolton and Freixas (2006) presents an "asymmetric-information views of credit markets." equilibrium is one with no bank or firm entry. Challe and Ragot (2010) .
To assess the resilience of the economy to adverse shocks, we introduce the operational measure of "distance-to-crash" defined as the size of the smallest shock that leads to a crash.
The distance-to-crash answers questions such as: how much would aggregate productivity have to decrease to lead a crash? how many banks (resp. firms) would have to fail to trigger further bankruptcies and lead to a systemic failure? This framework formalizes the assessments of the ability of the financial and industrial sectors to overcome adverse shocks performed routinely by central banks and international institutions using stress testing methods (see Bank of England, 2008; European Central Bank, 2008; International Monetary Fund, 2008 ; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2009). While crashes do not necessarily occur, these off-equilibrium worst case scenarios provide a motive for policy action.
We study central bank policies through two main transmission channels, a bank-lending channel and direct intervention towards banks. In this model, we call "money" the riskfree claim on the stock of goods held by the policymaker ("central bank"). More precisely, the central bank issues money for three reasons: to "store" goods for repayment in the final period; to directly subsidize the operations of banks and firms; and to produce a public good.
We refer to the first task as the conventional interest rate policy of the central bank which controls the return on money (money is more desirable to hold when more goods are stored).
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This induces a classic bank lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder, 1989; Disyatat, 2010) :
given a lower riskfree rate, investors rebalance their portfolio towards risky deposits, thereby stimulating the entry of banks and firms. 6 The second task is part of "unconventional"
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In models of imperfect competition and strategic entry complementarities (Pagano, 1990; Cooper, 1994; Ciccone and Matsuyama, 1996) , there are multiple equilibria when the complementarities are strong. We assume that agents (investors, entrepreneurs, bank managers) coordinate in the Pareto dominating equilibrium.
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If the price level is the inverse of the value of money, a lower riskfree rate implies higher inflation.
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This channel of monetary policy leads to an increase in both the intensive margin (the size of projects) and the extensive margin (the number of firms and banks). When adverse shocks are on the verge of hitting balance-sheet policies (or credit policies) as the central bank uses its own balance-sheet to directly stimulate the economy (Borio and Disyatat, 2009; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010, forthcoming) . The third task is the provision of public goods and it creates an opportunity cost for the use of resources of the central bank. 7 The utility of investors provides a welfare measure that can be used to evaluate the effects of monetary policy. We characterize the first-best policies (in the absence of adverse shocks and stability concern). In particular, we study two balance-sheet policies: an interest-rate-neutral subsidy to bank entry and a money-supplyneutral subsidy to bank entry. Faced with adverse shocks, the central bank can mitigate the vulnerability of the economy by lowering the riskfree rate or by subsidizing the operations of firms or banks. Curdia and Woodford (2010) characterize two main assumptions under which the balance-sheet of the central bank does not matter. While the model of Section I satisfies the first criteria put forward by Curdia and Woodford ("the asset in question are valued only for their pecuniary returns," page 5), the setup with imperfect bank and firm competition relaxes the second criteria ("all investors can purchase arbitrary quantities of the same assets at the same (market) prices", page 5). In our case, the balance-sheet of the central bank matters to stimulate the economy. 8 By fostering bank competition, unconventional balance-sheet interventions increase the aggregate supply of risky securities and modify the equilibrium allocation of capital and the prices. Since Diamond and Dybvig (1983) , the focus is on understanding bank runs and the role of the lender of last resort to prevent a given institution from collapsing. While policy targeted at a particular institution is important, we follow Farhi and Tirole (2009) in focusing on non-targeted policy and its impact on the decisions of a population of firms. In cases in which it is impossible or undesirable to prevent the collapse of an individual institution, we describe general equilibrium linkages through which the failure spills over to the economy and we study ways in which policy makers can "manage the systemic risk of bank failures" (Richardson and Roubini, 2009) . While a large literature focuses on the aggregate consequences of the rigidities of debt or equity contracts the economy, an accommodative monetary policy can prevent an economic contraction and the likely exit of firms and banks.
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Keister (2010) use a similar setup to discuss fiscal policy in times of stress.
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See Gertler and Karadi (2010) for a model of unconventional monetary policy. (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; He and Krishnamurthy, 2008) , we abstract from contractual frictions and emphasize the role of imperfect competition. 9 This paper is complementary to studies in which the interbank market can help absorb adverse liquidity shocks (Allen and Gale, 2000b; Freixas, Martin, and Skeie, 2009; Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen, 2010) . This paper is also related to the large empirical literature on the transmission of adverse shocks and monetary to the real economy (Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, 1993; Kashyap and Stein, 2003; Ashcraft, 2005; Paravisini, 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2008) I. Model
There are five dates, t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. At date 0, policy decisions are made. At date 1, the shocks (to be defined below) are realized. At date 2, the entry decisions of entrepreneurs and bank managers are made. At date 3, bank managers set the lending and deposit rates, entrepreneurs make the investment decision taking the lending rates as given and the riskaverse investor makes the portfolio decision taking the deposit rates as given. Output is realized at date 4 and repayments take place.
A crash is an ex-ante (date 2) situation in which no entrepreneur and no bank manager has an incentive to enter. In this case, the revenues of the bank managers and entrepreneurs are not large enough to cover the cost of operation. The stability of the economy is characterized by the size of smallest productivity or liquidity shock that leads to a crash (distance-to-crash).
Bank competition is measured by the size of the intermediation markup (the difference between the lending and deposit rates) and non-financial firm competition, by the size of the investment markup (the difference between the technological productivity and the lending rate paid to the banks).
I.1. Uncertainty and the supply of capital. Identical investors with aggregate capital Y have log-preferences and choose between immediate consumption c and investment for future consumption. They can invest k M in a riskfree security yielding the return r M . They can also invest in a set of risky projects.
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In this paper, the liquidation value of projects is zero, so that there is no difference between debt or equity contracts.
We make specific assumptions on the correlation structure of risky projects (to be discussed below). There is an infinite countable set of industrial sectors, each indexed by ϕ in the unit interval and there is an endogenous number N e of risky projects per sector (N e > 1).
Investing in a firm is equivalent to buying a security that pays in two states of nature, either with all the firms of its sector or alone. More precisely, for each risky project indexed by
promising a deposit rate r(ϕ, n) if it generates revenue (and by limited liability, zero otherwise), the objective function of investors is
where β is the discount rate, q = 1 − p 0 − N e p 1 > 0 is the probability that no project pays off and k M , k(ϕ, n) are the investments in the riskfree and risky securities. The first integral in Equation (1.1) represents the expected utility when all firms in a sector pay out and the second integral, when only one firm in a sector pays out. This formulation is an extension of Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) ; Martin and Rey (2004) ; Champonnois (2008) which has four main advantages: different projects are imperfectly correlated so that there is safety in variety for the investor; depending on p 0 and p 1 , any correlation between projects (positive or negative) is possible; an increase in the number of projects N e makes the common state more crowded and leads, as we describe below, to an increase in competition; and this formulation is a parsimonious representation with ex-ante identical projects. 10 The budget constraint is
Because of the logarithmic preferences, the first period consumption is c = Y /(1+β). Denote y = βY /(1 + β) as the disposable income after consumption. For a given sector ϕ, we study the supply of capital for a given project n (all other projects in the industry are indexed by j).
10 The setup in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) ; Martin and Rey (2004) with pure Arrow securities (p 0 = 0) imposes a negative correlation between project, which has been criticized by Okawa and van Wincoop (2009) .
Lemma 1. Under the condition that (p 0 + p 1 )r n ≥ r M , the supply of capital k is given by
which is an increasing concave function in the return r n (given the returns r j offered by other projects). The elasticity of the supply of capital is increasing in the number of firms N e and in the riskfree money investment k M .
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I.2. Demand for capital. Given the supply of capital from the portfolio decision of the representative investor, the demand for capital depends on the investment decisions of entrepreneurs and the intermediation decision of bank managers.
Investment decision. The projects ("firms") are run by risk-neutral entrepreneurs. The production technology has constant returns A and entrepreneurs set the return r to maximize their profit (p 0 + p 1 )AK(r) − r(1 + ξ)K(r) − f e , where ξ > 0 is an intermediation markup fixed by the bank and f e is the operation/entry cost.
Lemma 2. The first-order condition of entrepreneurs implies
( 1.3)
The left-hand side of equation (1.3) in Lemma 2 is the markup charged by entrepreneurs.
This markup is strictly positive as each project is important for the diversification of the investor and the entrepreneur running it has some marginal monopoly power in setting the markup. In contrast to model in which the investment decision is based on moral hazard or asymmetric information problems Gertler, 1989, 1990; Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) , the markup in (1.3) is endogenous and depends on the competition between firms. As in monopolistic competition models, the free entry of entrepreneurs drives profit to zero:
The revenues of the firm (left-hand side of Equation (1.4)) are decreasing in the number of firms and in the markup ξ.
Intermediation decision. There is a finite number of financial intermediaries ("banks") uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. 12 They are separated by the endogenous distance 2z so that there
banks in equilibrium. Each bank is specialized in providing financial services close to its location. If a bank is located at a distance ϕ from a firm, it incurs the cost f ϕ ϕ when lending to it. A lower intermediation cost f ϕ makes bank competition tougher while a larger f ϕ increases "segmentation" and softens bank competition. Subject to the contestability by other banks, a bank manager maximizes its expected revenue
for each industry ϕ. We assume that banks are constrained to offer only one intermediation price ξ to all firms (non-discriminatory pricing) and a bank can contest the loans offered by other banks (subject to the distance cost).
13 Banks also have the option not to lend to a particular firm or industry. By symmetry, a bank serves all firms with a distance of at most z in equilibrium. We focus here on the equilibrium in which all industries are served and Appendix VI.3 discusses other equilibria.
Lemma 3 (Intermediation decision). When all loan terms are contested by the closest bank, the intermediation markup ξ is such that the following equation holds:
(1.5) Figure 3 illustrates the spatial setup. For a given distance between banks 2z, if a bank sets the markup ξ such that the revenue (p 0 N e + p 1 )ξrk is strictly above f ϕ z, then for small, the industries located in z − is not served. The bank can therefore increase its profit by raising its revenue (p 0 N e + p 1 )ξrk. If a bank sets the markup ξ such that the revenue (p 0 N e + p 1 )ξrk is strictly above f ϕ z, then the two closest banks can set a marginally lower 12 We ignore "border effects": the segment [0, 1] is a circle. In this paper, we focus on symmetric banks.
Vogel (2008) studies a model of spatial competition in which asymmetric agents face location decisions. 13 In a previous version, we allowed banks to price-discriminate. While this assumption reduced the tractability of the model, it led to identical qualitative behaviors, namely that the revenues of banks (resp. firms) is increasing in the number of firms (resp. banks) and decreasing in the number of banks (resp. firms). 
Too high bank markup Too low bank markup
intermediation markups such that their revenues are strictly between f ϕ z and (p 0 N e + p 1 )ξrk
and serve industries at a distance larger than z from them. In both case, these strategies of bank 1 are not compatible with the equilibrium and it can increase its profit by setting ξ
Equation ( (imperfect competition between banks). Second, an increase in number of banks N b leads to a smaller markup ξ and to an increase in firm revenue (Equation (1.4)).
Lemma 4 (Bank free entry). The bank free entry condition imposes
The assumption of the allocation of banks on the circle (Sussman, 1993 ) is a convenient way to model the imperfect competition between banks. Banks have a local monopoly power which allows them to be imperfect substitute to each other and to charge a markup which is strictly positive on average. Setups with islands (Cooper and Corbae, 2002; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010, forthcoming) have generally the same property of imperfect substitutability between banks.
I.3. Aggregate budget constraint and equilibrium. Given the ex-ante symmetry in firms and banks, the aggregate budget constraint is written as
We assume that if no banks enter, firms receive no capital and have no revenues. Similarly when no firms enters, banks have no use for their deposits and therefore no revenues. The no entry case is an equilibrium. We define now the equilibrium for the entry of firms and banks, taking policy decisions on r M as given Definition 1. An equilibrium with entry is a set of variables N e , N b , r, k, ξ satisfying 1. the pricing conditions ( 1.5) 2. the entry conditions for entrepreneurs and bank managers (1.4) and ( 1.6) 3. the budget constraint of the representative investor (1.7), 4. Pareto dominance: no other allocation N e , N b , r, k, ξ satisfying the items 1. to 3.
delivers a higher utility to the investor.
As noted before, this model has many equilibria and we focus on the equilibrium that delivers the highest utility to the investor which is an equilibrium where all industries are served.
14 I.4. Renormalization. Even though we have a production economy, it is easier to solve the equilibrium in the space of dividends paid to the investors (rather than prices/returns or investments/portfolio shares). Introduce λ =
We will call d M the "money dividend" as the liquidation value of money.
14 For equilibria in which not all industries are served, see Appendix VI.3. Proposition 1. The system of equation is then
The first equation is the condition of free entry for firms while the second equation is the intermediation pricing condition for banks. Although this system is highly nonlinear, it is possible to show that the solutions of this system can be reduced to one polynomial equation in one variable using basic techniques from Elimination Theory (see Appendix VI.1).
However, to exploit closed form solutions, we focus in the following sections on particular assumptions in the correlation structure.
I.5. Equilibrium. In the rest of the paper, we focus on the special case in which idiosyncratic risk converges to 0 (λ very small but positive) and projects within industries become almost perfectly correlated. For intuition on the role of idiosyncratic risk, we derive the results on stability of Section II.1 under different assumptions with λ > 0 in Appendix VI.4.
Even if λ is very small (but positive), the investor has the same incentives to diversify his allocation across projects and the previous results hold. In this case, the system in the variables d, N e converges to
(1.10) Equation (1.10) has in general two roots and following the previous discussion on equilibrium selection, we focus on the root that implies the largest number of firms. There are two constraints: a positive discriminant for Equation (1.10) and the condition that at least one firm per industry operates N e ≥ 1.
Lemma 5 (Existence of equilibrium). If 11) an equilibrium exists and the equilibrium number of firms N e ≥ 1 is decreasing in the entry costs f b and f e and the money dividend d M :
When the cost of firm entry φ e is high, then the "N e = 1"-constraint is the most binding one, while when φ e is lower, then the discriminant constraint is the most binding one. When the cost f e and f b are high, the profit of entrepreneurs is low and few firms enter. Similarly, when the money dividend d M is high, money is a high share of the portfolio of the investor and the supply of capital in Equation (1.2) is very elastic, the markups that bank managers and entrepreneurs charge are low and the profits are low too, leading few firms to enter.
Similarly, when there is perfect competition between banks (f b f ϕ = 0), the discriminant condition is never binding. While when f b ≥ f e , the "N e = 1-constraint is never binding.
The following Lemma shows that the main measures of competition (the markups charged by banks and firms) are increasing in the entry costs and the money dividend. 
Using the second equation, the maximum payout that can be promised to the investor, while still covering the entry cost, is p 0 ay[1−φ e ] and this plays a similar role to the pledgeable income in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) ; Tirole (2006) , except that the private benefit from shirking is replaced with the entry cost f e . The frontier for the existence of an equilibrium. This figure shows the Equation (1.11) in φ b and φe with d M = .1. For low value of φe, the discriminant is the binding condition while for high value of φe, the condition Ne = 1 is the binding one. 
II. Economic stability
In this section, we study the economy stability of the equilibrium with entry of banks and firms. Following Allen and Gale (2000a), we perturb the equilibrium and study its existence and the entry of firms and banks.
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II.1. Distance-to-crash. We study the critical values in productivity, number of firms or banks at which a crash could take place. The distances to these critical values represent measures of economic stability and they allow to evaluate the size and shape of the basin of attraction of the equilibrium with entry of firms and banks. By analogy to the credit risk literature which uses the distance-to-default to evaluate the probability of default, we define the distance-to-crash as the size of the smallest shock leading to a crash. In this section, we 15 While crashes, in this model, are very severe events in which no firm or bank enters, a generalized version with heterogenous sectors (each sector having it own free entry condition) would lead to the possibility of milder crashes in which the weaker sectors would collapse (their free entry condition would no longer hold) but the stronger sectors would still find it profitable to operate. Moreover, while we interpret the very severe no-entry crash as an off-equilibrium worst-case scenario prevented by the intervention of policy markers, the milder crashes of a generalized model could be interpreted as actual financial crises.
show how these measures of economic stability are decreasing in the entry costs f e , f b and in the money dividend d M .
Assumption 1. Aggregate shock on productivity: the productivity a decreases to a(1 − ω a ).
Lemma 6. The distance-to-crash relative to aggregate shocks ω a is decreasing in the entry costs f e , f b and the money dividend d M :
of the
The first inequality in Equation (2.1) is the condition at least one firm enters when the productivity a decreases, while the second inequality is related to a positive discriminant for equilibrium determination of N e (Equation (1.10)). Note that this formulation in terms of the some banks going bankrupt for exogenous reasons is equivalent to assuming a temporary increase in the bank entry cost f b . 16 In the following Lemma, we characterize the distance-to-crash.
Lemma 7. The distance-to-crash relative to bank liquidity shocks is decreasing in f e , f b and
2)
The first inequality in Equation (2.2) is again related to the condition N e ≥ 1 while the second equation ensures that the discriminant of Equation (1.10) is positive.
16 The interpretation of a shock on the number of banks or a shock on the entry cost is different. In the first case, it can be seen as an exogenous idiosyncratic shock affecting a limited number of banks, while in the second case, it is an aggregate shock affecting all banks at the same time.
Assumption 3. Idiosyncratic liquidity shock on firms: a number ω e N e of firms go bankrupt for exogenous reasons and are not immediately replaced (sticky entry).
Lemma 8. The distance-to-crash relative to firm liquidity shocks is decreasing in f e , f b and
is the solution of
The first inequality in Equation (2.3) is simply that N e ≥ 1 1−ωe so that there is at least one remaining firm after the shock (N e (1 − ω e ) ≥ 1). The second inequality is related to the discriminant of the pricing condition in Equation (1.9) and ensures that there is a dividend d ≥ 0 consistent with the decision of banks as the number of firms N e decreases.
II.2. Systemic risk and too-big-to-fail banks and firms. The reaction of the economy to adverse shocks is characterized by two adverse feedback loops (see Figure 2 ). In the case of the liability-side liquidity spiral, when the economy is hit by an adverse productivity shock, the deposits of banks decrease, and the direct effect is to force the exit of some banks and the relaxation of bank competition, leading to an increase in intermediation markups and a decrease in the deposit rate. The indirect effect from the decrease in the deposit rate is a decrease in the supply of deposits. If the indirect effect is stronger than the direct effect, the vicious circle leads to a crash. The key friction is that bank managers and entrepreneurs have to charge distortionary markups to cover the fixed operation costs f e and f b . When the revenues are insufficient, firms and banks cannot operate and economic activity breaks down.
In the case of the asset-side liquidity spiral, when the economy is hit by a liquidity shock, for instance the exit of some banks for exogenous reasons, bank competition is relaxed and lending rates increase and the direct effect is to force the exit of firms due to lower profit.
But indirectly, the demand for bank loans decreases which might also force the exit of some banks. Again, when the indirect effect is stronger than the direct effect, the vicious circle leads to a crash. When the failure of a single bank leads to a crash (ω b N b = 1), all banks are "too-big-to-fail" and the economy is exposed to systemic risk.
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These results are related to Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) who study how shocks are transmitted from the non-financial sectors to intermediaries and vice-versa. More precisely, they study a credit crunch (stress at the firm level) and a collateral squeeze (stress at the intermediary level). While the nature of the shocks are different (Holmstrom and Tirole study the role of collateral shocks, while we look at free entry frictions), the common emphasis is on the substitutability between banks and firms. Buffers at the bank (resp. firm) level can compensate for stress at the firm (resp. bank) level. The contribution of this paper is to push this logic forward and study when there is a discontinuous effect of additional stress on banks on firms (and reciprocally). For instance, a crash caused by a liquidity shock on firms is a situation in which the buffers of banks are insufficient and economic activity collapses.
In Section III, we study the instruments that the central bank can use to mitigate the impact of aggregate shocks and possibly prevent any crash from actually taking place (so that these crashes are off-equilibrium worst-case scenarios).
II.3. Numerical illustration. We set the normalized entry parameters
• the normalized firm entry cost is φ e = fe p 0 ay = .145,
• the normalized bank entry and distance costs are The expression "too-big-to-fail" is used in two related contexts: first, to denote institutions whose failure can cause significant damage to the rest of the economy; and second, the moral hazard related to the awareness that significant damage caused to the economy are very likely to lead to government intervention.
In this section, we are interested in the first definition of "'too-big-to-fail". In Figure 5 , we illustrate the discriminant as well as the distances-to-crash relative bank and firm liquidity shocks for different values (φ b , φ e ) (left panel) and (d M , φ e ) (right panel).
When the equilibrium allocation (represented by the diamond on the two panels) is below the dashed lines, then the economy can absorb adverse shocks of sizes ω e and ω b . However, when the allocation is between the solid and dashed lines, economic activity reamains high is there is no shocks but collapses under adverse shocks of sizes ω e and ω b .
III. Monetary policy
In this section we study how the instruments of monetary policy affect the efficiency and the stability of the allocation of capital, but also can mitigate the real effects of productivity shocks or bank and firm liquidity shocks. Since the number of firms N e depends on monetary policy through the money dividend d M in Equation (1.10), the equilibrium demand for money from the aggregate budget constraint of the representative investor and the return r M are also endogenous
III.1. Policy objectives and instruments. An advantage of proceeding from explicit microfoundations is that the welfare of private agents (here the utility of investors since bank managers and entrepreneurs are risk-neutral and make zero profit) provides a natural objective in terms of which alternative policies can be evaluated. 19 The first-best welfare measure without crash is the utility of the representative investor
where G is some public goods financed by the issuance of money and U no entry = α log(G) + log(p 2 0 ay) + log(d M ) is the utility of the representative investor if there is no entry of firms and banks (crash). Taking into account the likelihood of adverse shocks and crashes, the expected utility of the representative investor is U = U entry × (1 − P crash ) + U no entry P crash = U no entry − p 0 log(1 − p 0 φ e N e ) × (1 − P crash ).
where the probability of a crash P crash is a function of the distances-to-crash. The equation illustrates the dual role of monetary in which policy markers can influence both the probability of U entry (first-best allocation under no adverse shocks) and the probability of a crash P crash , leading to no entry of banks and firms. The balance-sheet of central bank is
18 For a constant value of θ = φ b φe , a higher value of the money dividend d M reduces the probability that the equilibrium exists and the condition for the existence of the equilibrium can rewritten as
19 This is analogous to New Keynesian models in which the utility of consumers is used as a welfare measure to evaluate different inflation paths (Woodford, 2003) . See the welfare objective in Rochet (2004) .
where k 0 is stored at rate r 0 , T is the subsidy for the operations of banks and firms and G is a public good. We study the following non-targeted objectives for the policymaker (central bank):
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• Interest rate policy: the central bank faces an exogenous riskfree "storage" rate r 0 and chooses the value of d M to maximize the utility of the investor taking into account the provision of public goods G.
• Balance-sheet policy with public goods: the balance-sheet of the central bank is directly used to subsidize the entry of banks and firms.
The first instrument is often described as conventional monetary policy while the second objective is as unconventional monetary policy (Borio and Disyatat, 2009) Reduced-from interest rate policy. We first look at a "reduced-form" interest rate policy in which the central bank directly controls the riskfree rate.
Lemma 9. The first-best policy d
M to maximize the utility of investors upon entry with no public goods is
20 See Farhi and Tirole (2009) for a discussion of targeted versus non-targeted policies. 21 We distinguish here targeted emergency lending (such as the support to Northern Rock in the UK, Bear
Stearns, AIG, Citigroup in the US, UBS in Switzerland) from non-targeted fiscal policy.
The optimal d M is an interior solution with respect to the existence constraint in Equation (1.11) (positive discriminant and N e = 1) so that the policymaker would never choose under this objective any distance-to-crash equal to zero. Nevertheless under some scenarios, the distance-to-crash is insufficient and the policy marker would decrease the riskfree rate to increase the distance-to-crash.
Corollary 2. If there is a high risk of exit of banks or firms, it may be optimal to choose
M by choosing a lower interest rate r M .
When r M decreases, investors rebalance their portfolio towards the risky deposits and firms and banks can charge higher markups which allows them to absorb the adverse shocks.
Lower interest rates (below the optimal r To stimulate the economy, the central bank lowers the riskfree rate by decreasing the storage allocation k 0 and increasing the provision of public goods G. With a lower riskfree rate, the investor rebalances its portfolio away from money and towards the risky deposits which stimulates the economy and in particular increases the number of firms N e . This also increases the distance-to-crash as entrepreneurs and bank managers compete with a lower riskfree rate r M . The tradeoff for the central bank is that the utility of the investor is increased through a higher provision of public goods and more economy stability but the investor is less well diversified given that the allocation to the riskfree security (money) has decreased. Figure 6 shows the two first-best interest rate policies (reduced-form and policy with public goods) d M as a function of the entry cost φ e . First, these two policies are not very different for high firm entry cost φ e , but they differ for low φ e in which the condition G ≥ 0 becomes binding. Second, when these two policies are below the distances-to-crash relative to bank and firm liquidity shocks ω b and ω b , then the first-best policies can absorb these shocks. When these policies are above the distances-to-crash, then the policy maker has a motive for decreasing the riskfree rate (or equivalently decreasing the money dividend d M ) and departing from the first-best.
III.3. Unconventional monetary policy: balance-sheet policy. The balance-sheet of the central bank is k M = k 0 + T + G and we now consider and non-zero subsidy T which is in general positive. If T < 0, this is in fact a tax on entry. Moreover, we assume that T is only used to influence the entry of banks and a similar logic applies to the entry of firms.
Constant interest rate. We impose that the intervention of the central bank keeps a constant interest rate r M . The number of firms is given by the free entry condition
We then have
and it is equivalent for the central bank to choose T or φ b and in what follows we focus on the banking entry cost as the choice variable. A constant r M leads to
and the provision of the public good is
where N e depends on φ b through Equation (1.10).
Lemma 11. The first-best cost φ f b b = H(φ e |p 0 , α, θ, r 0 ) is the solution of a 7th-order polynomial equation.
To stimulate the economy, the central bank increases the subsidy T for bank entry. With more bank competition, the deposit rates are higher and the investor rebalances its portfolio towards risky deposits so that its demand for money k M decreases and the central bank decreases the stored amount of goods k 0 . Although the riskfree rate r M remained constant, part of the channel for the transmission of monetary policy is through a rebalancing of the portfolio of the investor. In the next section, we consider an intervention that keeps the portfolio of the investor unchanged.
Constant money supply. We now focus on direct interventions that keep the money supply k M is constant. This intervention has similarities to sterilized interventions in the foreign exchange markets that keep the domestic supply of money constant. A second response to this type of stress by one institution (or a limited number of institutions) is to let them fail and "find ways to manage the systemic risk of bank failures" (Richardson and Roubini, 2009) . In this case, we identify three broad channels for monetary policy: a deposit channel (the conventional interest-rate policy that focuses on the portfolio tradeoff of investors/depositors); a lending channel (an unconventional monetary policy that uses the balance-sheet of the central bank to relax the imperfect competition between banks); and a borrowing channel (also an unconventional monetary policy which affects the competition between firms). The policy responses can then be interpreted as injections of "liquidity" (either with a lower riskfree rate or with direct subsidies for banks or firms).
IV. Extensions of the results
IV.1. Financial fragility and crash. There are many papers studying financial fragility and the propagation and amplification of shocks (most notably Gertler, 1989, 1990; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009 ). Allen and Gale (2007) "use the phrase 'financial fragility', to describe situations in which small shocks have a significant impact on the financial system." where ∇J(x|y, θ) is the Jacobian of J. In this paper, we define a crash as the critical value y =ȳ(θ) for which the system is singular:
When the Jacobian ∇J(x|y, θ) becomes closer to a singular matrix, small shocks lead to larger movements in the endogenous variables. Financial crises take place when there are very large variations, and at the limit, discontinuities, in the endogenous variables.
IV.2. Bifurcation theory and Elimination theory. This is related to the Bifurcation theory and Catastrophe theory in Mathematics (Arnol'd, 1992; Demazure, 1991) . A bifurcation takes place at the value in which the system is singular (the "critical value" or "tipping point"). A "catastrophe" takes place when the bifurcation leads to a jump in the endogenous variables. 24 It should be noted that crashes are essentially nonlinear phenomena that disappear if the system is linearized (see the remarks in Mishkin, 2009, forthcoming; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2009; He and Krishnamurthy, 2008) . For a given equilibrium x * (y, θ), we are interested in the size and shape of the basin of attraction. The distance-tocrash is the distance y−ȳ(θ) y
. The economy can withstand any adverse shock smaller than the distance to crash. When the probability of large adverse shocks increases, the policymaker can adjust the policy instrument θ, which will increase or decrease the distance-to-crash.
For the tractability of the model, it is very useful to connect the Bifurcation theory to Elimination theory. Elimination theory (briefly described in Appendix VI.1 (see also Emiris and Mourrain, 1999) allows to solve polynomial systems. In particular, a discriminant is defined as conditions on the parameters for which a polynomial functions has a root of multiplicity 2 (or equivalently a polynomial function and its derivative have a common root).
The discriminant of a system therefore characterize the critical value at which a bifurcation occurs and so calculating distances-to-crash boils down to calculating discriminants of polynomial functions. Recently Bernanke also addressed the need to prepare for an "exit strategy" for ending the support to financial institutions and the period of very low interest rates.
In this paper, we propose a framework to guide macroprudential policies aimed at averting crashes. We present a general equilibrium model with two main ingredients: imperfect bank competition and a bank-lending channel for the transmission of monetary policy. In assessing the stability of the economy, we take a "stress-test approach" in which we focus on particular productivity and liquidity shocks and study their impacts on the equilibrium. Two new amplification mechanisms on the liability-side and asset-side liquidity of banks transmit shocks to the real economy through endogenous variations in the competition between banks (and the markups that they charge). This adverse feedback loop is different from financial accelerator in Gilchrist (1996, 1999) . In contrast to models in which there is a unique equilibrium and adverse shocks lead the economy to temporary movements away from this equilibrium, this paper presents a multiple-equilibria setup in which adverse shocks can lead to large discontinuous deviations. A crash is a situation in which the Pareto-dominant equilibrium disappears and only Pareto-dominated equilibria remain.
We introduce the distance-to-crash as a metric to evaluate the likelihood that shocks will 25 Note that one key reason for the equilibrium to be characterized by a polynomial system is that investors have log utilities.
a cause a collapse in financial intermediation and economic activity. When the economy is more vulnerable to adverse shocks with a smaller distance-to-crash, a decrease in the riskfree rate or direct subsidies to bank entry financed using the balance-sheet of the central bank improves the stability of the economy.
The model in this paper can be extended in several ways. First the model is static and a dynamic model would allow to study in more detail the propagation mechanisms and persistence of adverse shocks (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2009 ). Second the model has no nominal frictions. Introducing a nominal price level would allow to connect with traditional models of monetary policy and inflation (Woodford, 2003) . Third, the paper studies the systemwide ability of the economy to absorb aggregate shocks. Individual bank capital as well as interbank lending provide other avenues to absorb shocks. Extending the model to introduce risk-averse bank managers would create a motive to hold riskfree capital as well as participate on the interbank market (Allen and Gale, 2000b; Freixas, Martin, and Skeie, 2009) . Fourth, the model has only one contracting period and adding an intermediary period would allow to study the role of short-term versus long-term contracts as well as the role of the central bank to inject liquidity at the intermediate refinancing stage (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998) . Fifth, bank or firm heterogeneity would allow to study the effect of adverse shocks on different population of firms and banks and the use of targeted policy responses.
Empirically, Kashyap and Stein (2003) ; Ashcraft (2005) ; Khwaja and Mian (2008) argue that there is some cross-sectional heterogeneity in the transmission of shocks by commercial banks.
Adrian and Shin (2010) also argue that there are differences between investment banks and commercial banks. Sixth, following Adrian and Shin (2010, forthcoming) , introducing riskshifting by bank managers and entrepreneurs would allow to study how the incentives of agents over the business cycle influenced by bank competition.
VI. Appendix VI.1. Elimination theory. Elimination theory deals with the problem of finding conditions on parameters of a polynomial system so that these equations have a common solution (Emiris and Mourrain, 1999) . For the system
the Sylvester matrix is
The condition detA[P, Q] = 0 on the parameters {p i , q j } is imposed if P and Q have a common solution.
The discriminant of a polynomial equation P is the determinant of the Sylvester matrix of for P and its first derivative P . The discriminant characterizes the condition on the parameters for which some solution disappear and plays a crucial role in Bifurcation theory (Arnol'd, 1992; Demazure, 1991) .
VI.2. Proofs.
VI.2.1. Proof of Lemma 1. The condition (p 0 + p 1 )r n ≥ r M is a sufficient condition when there are N e ex-post identical firms. In this case the function determining k is a second degree polynomial equation
This equation has a positive (and a negative) root when (p 0 + p 1 )r n ≥ r M .
VI.2.2. Proof of Lemma 2. The first-order condition imposes
a−r(1+ξ) r ∂ log k ∂ log r = a−r(1+ξ) r ∂ log(rk)
VI.2.3. Proof of Lemma 4. From Equation (1.5), the revenue per sector is 1 φe and the condition d ≥ 0 is automatically satisfied. The intersection of the N = 1 constraint and the discriminant is
The number of firms N e is decreasing in d M and φ b φ e and φ e
• Equation (1.10) is increasing in d M and φ b (since 1 − φ e N e 0) which decreases the largest root.
• if φ e < 1 2 and φ b < 1, then the Equation (1.10) is always increasing in φ e .
• if φ e > 1 2 and φ b < 1, then the derivative of Equation (1.10) in φ e is zero when N = 1−φ b 2φe−1 and for this value of N , Equation (1.10) is
The largest root is then smaller than 1−φ b 2φe−1 and therefore Equation (1.10) is increasing in φ e .
VI.2.6. Proof of Corollary 1. We have ξ =
(1−φe)(1−φeNe)
= φ e , and 1
1−φeNe and z = (1 − φ e )(1 − φ e N e ). Then h and z are the two roots of the equation (h is the largest root, z the smallest):
We study the effect of d M and φ e on h 
• similarly z is increasing in φ e . VI.2.7. Proof of Lemma 6. The two constraints can rewritten as VI.2.9. Proof of Lemma 8. The bank pricing condition of Equation (1.9) can be rewritten as when λ = 0
The critical number of firms for the entry of banks is defined when the derivative in N is zero, which implies
. x can be interpreted as a (normalized) measure of aggregate investment at the critical number of firms for some bank entry. Then using Equation (6.3), wē
Plugging theseN and d and rearranging, we find Equation ( This equation is equivalent to a 3rd-degree polynomial function in N e . Using Equation (1.10), we can write the Sylvester matrix of the two polynomial functions which yields a 4th-degree polynomial in d M .
With the condition G = 0, the first-order condition becomes Competitive regimes. The left panel illustrates the intermediation decisions of banks when the distance 2z between banks is small. In this case, the intermediation cost of bank 2 is below its monopoly revenues for some industries close to bank 1.
Contestability brings the bank revenues down (competitive revenues line). The right panel illustrates the intermediation decisions of banks when the distance 2z between banks is small. In this case, the intermediation cost of bank 2 is above the monopoly revenues for all industries between bank 1 andz it can not contest loans. Industries betweenẑ andz are not served because the intermediation costs for banks 1 and 2 are above the monopoly revenue.
When λ = 0, the system simplifies to is binding: the entry cost of banking f b f ϕ is relatively cheap and the constraint that no all sector are served by a bank is the binding one.
• if θ > 2, only the constraint N e > 1 is binding: now the entry cost of bank is high, which requires and high intermediation markup and hurts the entry of firms. The constraint N e = 1 is then more binding.
• when θ ∈ [1, 2], there is an intersection between the two constraints at φ e = 
